Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising capabilities in solving mathematical reasoning tasks, leveraging Chain-of-Thought (CoT) data as a vital component in guiding answer generation. Current paradigms typically generate CoT and answers directly for a given problem, diverging from human problem-solving strategies to some extent. Humans often solve problems by recalling analogous cases and leveraging their solutions to reason about the current task. Inspired by this cognitive process, we propose \textbf{MetaLadder}, a novel framework that explicitly prompts LLMs to recall and reflect on meta-problems, those structurally or semantically analogous problems, alongside their CoT solutions before addressing the target problem. Additionally, we introduce a problem-restating mechanism to enhance the model's comprehension of the target problem by regenerating the original question, which further improves reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the model can achieve reasoning transfer from analogical problems, mimicking human-like "learning from examples" and generalization abilities. Extensive experiments on mathematical benchmarks demonstrate that our MetaLadder significantly boosts LLMs' problem-solving accuracy, largely outperforming standard CoT-based methods (\textbf{10.3\%} accuracy gain) and other methods. Our code and data has been released at https://github.com/LHL3341/MetaLadder.

We recently reported evidence that large language models are capable of solving a wide range of text-based analogy problems in a zero-shot manner, indicating the presence of an emergent capacity for analogical reasoning. Two recent commentaries have challenged these results, citing evidence from so-called `counterfactual' tasks in which the standard sequence of the alphabet is arbitrarily permuted so as to decrease similarity with materials that may have been present in the language model's training data. Here, we reply to these critiques, clarifying some misunderstandings about the test materials used in our original work, and presenting evidence that language models are also capable of generalizing to these new counterfactual task variants.

Large language models (LLMs) have performed well on several reasoning benchmarks, including ones that test analogical reasoning abilities. However, it has been debated whether they are actually performing humanlike abstract reasoning or instead employing less general processes that rely on similarity to what has been seen in their training data. Here we investigate the generality of analogy-making abilities previously claimed for LLMs (Webb, Holyoak, & Lu, 2023). We take one set of analogy problems used to evaluate LLMs and create a set of "counterfactual" variants-versions that test the same abstract reasoning abilities but that are likely dissimilar from any pre-training data. We test humans and three GPT models on both the original and counterfactual problems, and show that, while the performance of humans remains high for all the problems, the GPT models' performance declines sharply on the counterfactual set. This work provides evidence that, despite previously reported successes of LLMs on analogical reasoning, these models lack the robustness and generality of human analogy-making.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

Human reasoning is grounded in an ability to identify highly abstract commonalities governing superficially dissimilar visual inputs. Recent efforts to develop algorithms with this capacity have largely focused on approaches that require extensive direct training on visual reasoning tasks, and yield limited generalization to problems with novel content. In contrast, a long tradition of research in cognitive science has focused on elucidating the computational principles underlying human analogical reasoning; however, this work has generally relied on manually constructed representations. Here we present visiPAM (visual Probabilistic Analogical Mapping), a model of visual reasoning that synthesizes these two approaches. VisiPAM employs learned representations derived directly from naturalistic visual inputs, coupled with a similarity-based mapping operation derived from cognitive theories of human reasoning. We show that without any direct training, visiPAM outperforms a state-of-the-art deep learning model on an analogical mapping task. In addition, visiPAM closely matches the pattern of human performance on a novel task involving mapping of 3D objects across disparate categories.

Analogies play a central role in human commonsense reasoning. The ability to recognize analogies such as "eye is to seeing what ear is to hearing", sometimes referred to as analogical proportions, shape how we structure knowledge and understand language. Surprisingly, however, the task of identifying such analogies has not yet received much attention in the language model era. In this paper, we analyze the capabilities of transformer-based language models on this unsupervised task, using benchmarks obtained from educational settings, as well as more commonly used datasets. We find that off-the-shelf language models can identify analogies to a certain extent, but struggle with abstract and complex relations, and results are highly sensitive to model architecture and hyperparameters. Overall the best results were obtained with GPT-2 and RoBERTa, while configurations using BERT were not able to outperform word embedding models. Our results raise important questions for future work about how, and to what extent, pre-trained language models capture knowledge about abstract semantic relations.

Letter-string analogy is an important analogy learning task which seems to be easy for humans but very challenging for machines. The main idea behind current approaches to solving letter-string analogies is to design heuristic rules for extracting analogy structures and constructing analogy mappings. However, one key problem is that it is difficult to build a comprehensive and exhaustive set of analogy structures which can fully describe the subtlety of analogies. This problem makes current approaches unable to handle complicated letter-string analogy problems. In this paper, we propose Neural logic analogy learning (Noan), which is a dynamic neural architecture driven by differentiable logic reasoning to solve analogy problems. Each analogy problem is converted into logical expressions consisting of logical variables and basic logical operations (AND, OR, and NOT). More specifically, Noan learns the logical variables as vector embeddings and learns each logical operation as a neural module. In this way, the model builds computational graph integrating neural network with logical reasoning to capture the internal logical structure of the input letter strings. The analogy learning problem then becomes a True/False evaluation problem of the logical expressions. Experiments show that our machine learning-based Noan approach outperforms state-of-the-art approaches on standard letter-string analogy benchmark datasets.

Figural analogy problems have long been a widely used format in human intelligence tests. In the past four decades, more and more research has investigated automatic item generation for figural analogy problems, i.e., algorithmic approaches for systematically and automatically creating such problems. In cognitive science and psychometrics, this research can deepen our understandings of human analogical ability and psychometric properties of figural analogies. With the recent development of data-driven AI models for reasoning about figural analogies, the territory of automatic item generation of figural analogies has further expanded. This expansion brings new challenges as well as opportunities, which demand reflection on previous item generation research and planning future studies. This paper reviews the important works of automatic item generation of figural analogies for both human intelligence tests and data-driven AI models. From an interdisciplinary perspective, the principles and technical details of these works are analyzed and compared, and desiderata for future research are suggested.

Analogies play a crucial role in commonsense reasoning. The ability to recognize analogies like "eye is to seeing what ear is to hearing," sometimes referred to as analogical proportions, shape how humans structure knowledge and understand language. In a new study that looks at whether AI models can understand analogies, researchers at Cardiff University used benchmarks from education as well as more common datasets. They found that while off-the-shelf models can identify some analogies, they sometimes struggle with complex relationships, raising questions about to what extent models capture knowledge. Large language models learn to write humanlike text by internalizing billions of examples from the public web.